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ABSTRACT
INTERGROUP SOLIDARITY IN PEACE ACTIVISM: THE POTENTIAL FOR
SUCCESS OR BACKLASH
FEBRUARY 2017
THOMAS C. O’BRIEN, A.B, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Linda R. Tropp

Integrating theory on distinct modes of social identity (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, &
Eidelson, 2008) with group-based emotion in protracted conflict (Halperin & Pilskin,
2015) and exposure to outgroups (Saguy & Halperin, 2014), this dissertation tests how
Jewish Israelis respond when ingroup members and outgroup members work together to
advocate for peaceful solutions to conflict (i.e., intergroup solidarity), and how
glorification of one’s national group moderates these responses. Instructing participants
to imagine a peace activist organization, Study 1 shows evidence that glorification of
one’s ingroup predicts more anger, less hope, and less support for a political solution
reflecting compromise. With a student sample, Study 2 shows that learning about an
activist organization where both groups work together, relative to an organization where
ingroup members work alone, increases support for allowing the organization to present
on campus by reducing anger and increasing hope. Manipulating both group composition
and the target of criticism, Study 3 shows that glorification becomes less predictive of
negative responses to activism when the activist organization consists of only ingroup
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members, and when both ingroup members and outgroup members are criticized for their
role in the conflict.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Activists trying to end intergroup conflict must elicit public support (Subašić,
Reynolds, & Turner, 2008), as any sustainable solution to the conflict will rely on it.
Understanding the effectiveness of different strategies for eliciting public support is thus
critical for activists and, ultimately, any party seeking to end intergroup conflict.
Activists advocating an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict often adopt the strategy of
intergroup solidarity, whereby both groups -- Jewish Israelis and Palestinians -- work
together to denounce past violence and advocate a permanent political solution that
brings peace (see Nasie, Bar-Tal, & Shnaidman; see also Perry, 2011). For example, the
group Combatants for Peace is an organization of Jewish Israelis and Palestinians who
“believe that only through joint action can we (Palestinians and Israelis) break the cycle
of violence and put an end to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories”
(Combatants for Peace, 2016). This demonstrates a powerful form of indirect contact for
members of the public witnessing activism (e.g., Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, &
Ropp, 1997); these activists who engage in intergroup solidarity provide an example for
other Israelis and Palestinians demonstrating that members of both groups want peace
and are willing to work together to achieve it.
Whereas this strategy reflects an intuitive understanding of psychological theory
on promoting harmonious relations between groups (see Vezzali, Hewstone, Capozza,
Giovannini, & Wölfer, 2014), other psychological perspectives could predict that
exposure to such examples of intergroup solidarity would have the opposite effect.
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Generally, people want to view ingroups that are important to them in a positive light
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and as moral (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). In arguing for
a change in relations between Israelis and Palestinians, activists are defying the
traditional norms and authority of the ingroup, and could also imply that the ingroup’s
policies and actions are, to some extent, to blame for the conflict. Both of these could
result in aversive reactions from ingroup members (Schacter, 1951; Tajfel & Turner,
1986; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Eidelson, 2008), especially if interpreted as forsaking
the interests of the ingroup to join an outgroup with whom one’s group is in conflict
(Travagilino et al., 2014).
Thus, the primary question guiding my dissertation is when intergroup solidarity
will elicit public support and when it will elicit backlash. More specifically, the research
presented in this dissertation tests whether intergroup solidarity in the context of peace
activism may elicit support or backlash relative to activism enacted by only ingroup
members or outgroup members, how glorification of the ingroup could moderate whether
intergroup solidarity elicits support or backlash, and how the target of activists’ criticism
determines whether intergroup solidarity elicits support or backlash.
How Indirect Contact and Exposure to Outgroups Can Enhance Intergroup
Relations
Research suggests that crossing group boundaries can have positive outcomes for
intergroup relations (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011).
Positive, indirect contact with outgroup members – that is, knowledge of ingroup
members having positive contact with outgroup members – can promote more positive
beliefs about those outgroups and support for behaviors that improve intergroup relations
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(Vezzali et al., 2014; Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). Indirect contact
improves intergroup relations in part by promoting more positive beliefs about the norms
that guide how the ingroup relates to the outgroup and vice versa (Turner, Hewstone,
Voci, & Vonofakou, 2008; Wright et al., 1997).
Beyond indirect contact, mere exposure to outgroups expressing views that either
promote positive relations with the ingroup (Leshem, Klare, & Flores, 2016; O’Brien,
Leidner, & Tropp, in press) or that show the ability to be critical of the ingroup (Saguy &
Halperin, 2014) can enhance positive outcomes. Such exposure to outgroups has been
shown to have a positive impact even in a context of protracted conflict; for example,
Jewish Israelis who watched a video of a Palestinian expressing hope for the IsraeliPalestinian conflict to end also expressed more hope for the conflict ending (Leshem et
al., 2016). When people living in a context of protracted conflict learned about members
of the outgroup with whom they are in conflict critiquing their own group (e.g., Israelis
learning about Palestinians criticizing Palestinians), they became more open to learning
about the outgroup’s perspective (Saguy & Halperin, 2014). Knowledge of ingroup and
outgroup members working together as activists to improve intergroup relations could
therefore represent a powerful form of exposure demonstrating that members of both
groups want peace and can work together toward that goal.
Responses to Intergroup Solidarity: The Role of Ingroup Identification
Still, how people respond to ingroup and outgroup members working together is
likely to depend on how they identify with their groups. As the ingroup becomes
psychologically important, identification motivates people to view the ingroup in
particular ways (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The more strongly people identify with their
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groups, the more they see the group as part of their own self-concept (Tropp & Wright,
2001), and the more important it is to view the ingroup in this positive light (Tajfel &
Turner, 1986). People also look to their groups to fulfill needs for understanding and
navigating the world (Correll & Park, 2005; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & Grada,
2006; Schacter, 1951). These needs become especially felt and thus groups become
especially important in contexts of protracted intergroup conflict, as people cling more
strongly to their groups as a resource for guiding intergroup relations and behavior (BarTal, Sharvit, Halperin, & Zafran, 2012).
One strategy for fulfilling the motivation to view the ingroup in a positive light is
blinding ourselves to evidence of the contrary, denying or downplaying the importance of
information that conflicts with a positive image of the ingroup (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz,
& Eidelson, 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). People also want to view the ingroup as
cohesive (Correll & Park, 2005; Schachter, 1951). The more important our groups are to
us, the more we want to see our ingroups as groups of people similar to one another with
common goals (Lickel et al., 2000). When people want to see their ingroups as unified,
they reject those who violate group norms (Schachter, 1951), and stronger identification
with their groups can lead people to reject deviant group members (Hutchison, Abrams,
& de Moura, 2013). Along with enhancing group identification, contexts of protracted
conflict are likely to increase the importance of viewing one’s ingroup as unified (BarTal et al., 2012).
In conflict settings, by advocating for changes to the nature of intergroup relations
and ingroup policies to be more amicable toward an outgroup, ingroup activists are
deviating from group norms and authorities, thereby representing divergence among
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ingroup members and potentially invoking criticism of how the ingroup handles relations
with the outgroup. To the extent that group members seek to avoid negative information
about the group and reject ingroup deviance, they should react with backlash to activists
rather than supporting their efforts.
How People Identify with the Ingroup Determines the Consequences of
Identification
More specifically, whether people welcome or reject both groups working
together in solidarity for peace activism to end intergroup conflict may ultimately depend
on how they identify with the ingroup. Different ways of identifying with ingroups can
have destructive or constructive outcomes for intergroup relations (e.g., Kosterman &
Feshbach, 1989; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Eidelson, 2008). The differentiation
between ingroup glorification and attachment (e.g., Roccas et al., 2008) is especially
relevant for understanding how people react to intergroup solidarity, because this kind of
activism challenges group members’ reverence for the ingroup’s norms and intergroup
behaviors, and could also present a moral challenge to their view of the ingroup.
Glorifiers believe that the ingroup is superior and that its members should defer to
ingroup norms, institutions, and leaders (Roccas et al., 2008). Glorifiers meet their need
to view the ingroup in a positive light by deploying defense mechanisms to delegitimize
any evidence that contradicts the positive image they have of their ingroup. For example,
when glorifiers learn about outgroup victims tortured at the hands of ingroup members,
they dehumanize those victims and demand less punishment of ingroup perpetrators than
when they learn about outgroup victims tortured at the hand of outgroup members
(Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010). Thus, rather than advocating for
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changes within the ingroup, glorifiers reject any evidence of the group needing to address
immoral behavior.
In contrast to glorification, attachment involves care for and commitment to the
ingroup (Roccas et al., 2008). To the extent that people feel attached to, but not inclined
to glorify, their ingroup, their motivation to view the ingroup in a positive light does not
necessarily blind them to the ingroup’s flaws. Rather, acknowledgement of ingroup
shortcomings could actually motivate people to address injustices the ingroup has
committed (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatin, 2006).
Taken together, these trends suggest that group members will likely show
different responses to intergroup solidarity depending on how they identify with their
groups. Glorifiers should be sensitive to activism generally, because activists defy the
norms and authorities of the ingroup. Moreover, glorifiers should be especially sensitive
to activism that takes the form of both groups working together (i.e., intergroup
solidarity), as the notion that change is needed could threaten their view of the ingroup as
superior.
Backlash or Support?
Research has yet to test how both of these processes – glorification with groups
and indirect exposure to other groups – may jointly contribute to predicting group
members’ responses to intergroup solidarity. In contrast to observing ingroup members
or outgroup members working on their own, seeing the groups work together in solidarity
for peace to end intergroup conflict could elicit either backlash or support. On the one
hand, both groups working together to reduce the conflict could constitute a powerful
form of indirect exposure to outgroups demonstrating the potential for more positive
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relations between the groups (Saguy & Halperin, 2014; Wright et al., 1997). On the other
hand, learning about ingroup members who are working together with outgroup members
could conflict with group members’ motivations to view their ingroups as unified (e.g.,
Bar-Tal et al, 2012; Lickel et al., 2000) and could elicit negative reactions reflecting
backlash, particularly among those who glorify their groups. Thus, the present research
tests whether intergroup activist organizations elicit support versus backlash, whether
divergent levels of support vs. backlash to activist organizations of these different group
compositions depend upon the extent to which participants glorify their ingroup, and
whether the target of the activist organization’s criticism (criticizing primarily the
ingroup or both groups) moderates divergent responses to organizations of different
group compositions.
How Emotions Predict Responses to Intergroup Solidarity: Anger and Hope as
Mediators
Moreover, the present research examines how these factors may elicit emotions
such as anger and hope, and how these emotions may guide group members’ responses to
intergroup solidarity. Group-based emotions have particular relevance in settings of
protracted intergroup conflict, as they direct people to support group actions that could
enhance or reduce the conflict (Halperin & Pilskin, 2015). When group identity is salient,
people who view their ingroup as strong are more prone to feel anger on behalf of their
group and express intentions to act aggressively towards outgroups (Mackie, Devos, &
Smith, 2000). Activism to end intergroup conflict should make social identity salient. As
they revere deference to ingroup norms and authorities (Roccas et al., 2008), those who
strongly glorify the ingroup should be especially likely to react with anger towards
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activism supporting a peaceful end to the conflict, as activists are, by definition,
challenging deference. The link between anger and glorification is consistent with past
research linking anger to group-based provocations among high glorifiers (Steele, Parker,
& Lickel, 2015). The link between anger directed at activists and opposition to their goals
is consistent with research in the Israeli context showing that anger is related to more
negative attitudes towards those advocating peace with Palestinians (perceiving them as
less wise and less patriotic), the general goal of resolving conflict with Palestinians, and
the specific solutions to achieve it (Kahn, Liberman, Halperin, & Ross, 2016)2. If
glorifiers react to activists with anger, this may be particularly acute when those activists
are engaging in intergroup solidarity, as joining with outgroup members violates ingroup
norms and authority to a stronger extent than other forms of activism.
Those who do not strongly glorify the ingroup should instead be less resistant to
defiance of ingroup norms and authorities (Roccas et al., 2008). Since they are not as
bound to viewing the ingroup as superior and revering deference to it, those who do not
strongly glorify the ingroup should react with less anger to intergroup solidarity than
those who do glorify the ingroup. For those low in glorification, in the absence of anger,
intergroup solidarity may result in more hope as it demonstrates a powerful form of
positive exposure to outgroups (e.g., Leshem et al., 2016; Saguy & Halperin, 2014).
In contrast to anger, hope entails thinking abstractly beyond what is happening in
the present (Bar-Tal, 2001; Isen, 2002; Snyder, 2002; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006).
Even in a context of protracted conflict, hope for better relations between an ingroup and
an outgroup can make people more receptive to learning about the outgroup’s perspective
(Saguy & Halperin, 2014), and can lead to support for actions that will enhance positive

8

relations between the ingroup and outgroup (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross,
2014). Thus, to the extent that glorification involves deference and viewing the group as
superior, lower levels of glorification should be associated with greater hope, and a
greater openness to hearing the activists’ message, and perhaps even eliciting support for
political solutions to the conflict.
Research Goals and Hypotheses
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to examine whether peace activism in
the form of intergroup solidarity provokes support or backlash among ingroup members,
and the role of glorification of the ingroup in moderating these effects. Below, in Figure
1, I present the overall conceptual model for the series of studies, in which I predict that
the extent to which people glorify their ingroup should determine whether intergroup
solidarity in peace activism should provoke support or backlash. I propose that those
who glorify their ingroup strongly should react more negatively towards activism in
general, and particularly towards activism involving intergroup solidarity, because they
will feel more anger and less hope in response to learning about members from both
groups working together.
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Figure 1. Conceptual model: Intergroup solidarity should predict support among those
low in glorification, and backlash among those high in glorification.

Activism and Intergroup Solidarity in the Israeli-Palestinian Context
These issues will be examined in the unique context of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Specifically, this dissertation research will test whether Jewish Israelis show
support for or backlash against peace activist organizations that represent intergroup
solidarity among Jewish Israelis and Palestinians, relative to their support for
organizations that include only Jewish Israelis (ingroup members). The protracted nature
of the conflict makes it a salient feature of daily life for people who live in this context
(Bar-Tal, 2007; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). The threat of violence, in some form, is
always present. Still, there are groups of Israelis and Palestinians who demonstrate, often
in solidarity with one another, against policies and actions they see as exacerbating the
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conflict (see Nasie et al., 2014; see also Perry, 2011). What follows below is a brief
summary of factors that are particularly important for understanding how peace activists
are trying to change opinions about the conflict among Jewish Israelis.
The sense of threat and victimhood that influences Jewish Israelis’ beliefs about
the conflict is about far more than relations between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians
(Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992; Vollhardt, 2009; Schori-Eyal, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2014). The
founding of the modern state of Israel in 1948 came after centuries of persecution of
Jewish people around the world, three years after the surrender of Nazi Germany to
Allied powers and the ending of the Holocaust. Scholars have argued that this history
enhances a mindset that bleeds into the relationship between Jewish Israelis and
Palestinians (e.g., Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992a; Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992b).
Israel’s relations with the broader Middle East, between the founding of the state
and through the 20th century, also enhances a mindset that often provokes defensive
attitudes regarding the conflict with Palestinians (e.g., Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992a; Bar-Tal
& Antebi, 1992b). Israel and neighboring Arab states engaged in several wars between
the founding of the modern state and the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and
Israel in 1978. Most consequential for political solutions posed for the conflict today are
the 1948 and 1967 wars. The major implications of the former included (1) the expulsion
of Palestinians from their homes in what is now Israel, part of the first stage in creating
the Palestinian refugee crisis, and (2) the prevailing of Israel in the face of attacks by
neighboring Arab states. The major implications of the six-day war of 1967 include the
occupation of the East Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan, as well as Gaza from
Egypt (Cleveland, 2004). Thus, when people refer to a two-state solution defined by the
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“1967” lines, it refers to allowing a Palestinian state in East Jerusalem, the West Bank,
and Gaza. Whereas both Egypt and Jordan have signed peace treaties with Israel, to
some extent, the conflict still involves other players in the Middle East (Kelman, 2007).
Policymakers and activists within Israel – as well as international organizations
and foreign governments – have proposed several options as permanent solutions to end
the conflict. Some of these solutions reflect a resistance to having the Jewish Israeli
ingroup make compromises, such as a one-state solution in which Israel remains a Jewish
State (either with some Palestinians still living there, or from which all Palestinians must
leave to neighboring Arab states). Other proposed solutions reflect a willingness among
Jewish Israelis to compromise, such as a two-state solution that would create an
independent Palestine (see Kelman, 2007). For example, the organization Combatants for
Peace, a joint Israeli and Palestinian activist organization, advocates for a two-state
solution based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as the capitol of the independent
Palestine (e.g., Combatants for Peace, 2016). Some also argue for a binational state in
which Jewish Israelis and Palestinians would have equal rights, a solution that would
greatly empower Palestinians from their current status (see Habib, 2016; see also Rumely
& Tibon, 2015).
The Oslo Accords, signed in 1993, were meant to bring about a permanent
solution. Whereas the Accords temporarily brought hope, continued violence following
the accords brought about skepticism with the peace process (see Perlmutter, 1995;
Shikaki, 1998; and Zogby Research Services, 2013). Frustration with the accords’ failure
to bring about a permanent solution led to the second Intifada, an uprising far more
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violent than the first. Erupting in 2001, the Second Intifada created a wave of violence
between Israelis and Palestinians (Sharoni & Abu-Nimer, 2013).
Presently, peace activists have to argue for a change in Israeli policies to a
generation that has seen past efforts towards peace fail, who have witnessed suicide
bombings, and many of whom may have had family members killed or injured in the
conflict. Indeed, the distress and sense of threat that exposure to political violence brings
on can generally increase resistance to making compromises in the conflict (Canetti,
Elad-Strenger, Lavi, Guy, & Bar-Tal, 2015). Moreover, the memories of violence and the
threat of future violence is especially likely to make many people cling to their group
identities, making them less willing to accept messages that threaten the positive and
unified image of their ingroup (Bar-Tal et al., 2012).
Overview of Research Studies
Informed by the ongoing conflict, this dissertation examines how Jewish Israelis
respond to intergroup solidarity for peace between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians, by
testing how (a) the group composition of activist organizations and (b) how people
identify with their ingroup (glorification) impact their support for or backlash against
activist organizations seeking to end the conflict. More specifically, with a national
sample of Jewish Israelis, Study 1 tested how people would react to an activist
organization composed of both ingroup and outgroup members (i.e., intergroup
solidarity), as compared to one composed exclusively of ingroup members, or one
composed exclusively of outgroup members, and whether participants’ levels of
glorification moderated their responses to political solutions to the conflict. With a
student sample, Study 2 tested how the group composition of activist organizations and
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levels of glorification predicted both responses to political solutions to the conflict and
students’ support for activist organizations on campus to express their views. Returning
to a national sample, Study 3 examined more precisely how Jewish Israelis would
respond to the group composition of activist organizations depending on whether these
organizations were explicitly critical of both groups, or only of the ingroup, and also
whether the effects of group composition and target of criticism depended upon levels of
glorification.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1
Study 1 Introduction
Study 1 sought to test whether an activist organization composed of both ingroup
members and outgroup members would elicit higher levels of anger, lower levels of hope,
and consequently lower levels of support for political solutions reflecting compromise
than an activist organization composed of only ingroup members, or only outgroup
members. The main goal of Study 1 was to determine how group composition of the
activist organization would affect participants’ emotions and support for political
solutions depending upon the degree to which they glorified the ingroup. I predicted that
those who scored high on glorification would react most negatively (i.e., with higher
levels of anger, lower levels of hope, less support for political solutions reflecting
compromise and more support for political solutions empowering the ingroup) to an
intergroup activist organization, as compared to the other conditions. In contrast, I
hypothesized that those who scored low on glorification would react most receptively, by
showing less anger, more hope, more support for political solutions reflecting
compromise, and less support for political solutions that would give power to the
ingroup. To test these hypotheses, I conducted an experiment asking participants to
imagine a peace activist organization, assigning them randomly to conditions in which
the organization included a combination of ingroup members and outgroup members
working together (intergroup solidarity condition), only ingroup members (ingroup
condition), or only outgroup members (outgroup condition).
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Study 1 Methods
Participants and Procedure
A between-participants experiment with three conditions tested these hypotheses
with Jewish Israeli adults recruited through the online service Midgam
(http://www.midgam.com/).
Participants were asked to imagine one of three peace activist organizations: one in which
members of the organization are exclusively Jewish Israeli (ingroup condition), one in
which members of the organization are exclusively Palestinian (outgroup condition), and
one that includes Jewish Israeli and Palestinian peace activists working together in
solidarity (intergroup solidarity condition). Besides descriptions of the group membership
of the activist organizations (Jewish Israeli, Palestinian, or both), the text describing the
goals and work of each peace activist organization was held constant across conditions.
The English version of the manipulation is below:
We would like for you to imagine a peace activist organization that consists of (Jewish
Israelis/Palestinians/Jewish Israelis and Palestinians working together). This group uses
non-violent methods to promote peace between Israelis and Palestinians. It works with
other Israeli organizations using non-violence, but it is not working with any Palestinian
organizations, and only Jewish Israelis belong to the organization.

At the end of the study, participants were asked to respond to a multiple choice
question regarding the group composition of the peace activist organization about which
they read, as an attention check for the experimental manipulation. Of 159 Jewish Israeli
adults who completed the study, 31 did not pass the attention check, incorrectly stating
the group composition of the activist organization they were asked to imagine, including
nine in the ingroup condition, seven in the intergroup condition, and 17 in the outgroup
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condition. These exclusions left a total of 126 participants, Including 64 males and 62
females (ages 18-72; M = 39.61, SD = 14.27). Analyses yielded similar results whether
excluding or not excluding the 31 participants who did not accurately respond to the
attention check.
Measures
Unless stated otherwise, participants were asked to respond to each of the
following items on a 1-9 sliding scale, with higher scores indicating an affirmative
response to the question or statement.
Anger and hope in reaction to the activist organization. Participants were asked to
respond to a series of adjectives and statements to assess the emotions they felt when
thinking about the organization.
Instructions: In this next set of questions, we would like to ask you about the
emotions you feel when thinking about this organization, moving the slider below
anywhere between “Not at all” and “Absolutely”. When thinking about this
organization, I feel…
To assess anger in reaction to the organization, participants were asked to respond
to the following adjectives adapted from prior research assessing anger (e.g., Halperin,
2011; Mackie et al., 2000): Angry, Irritated, Annoyed, Irate, and Betrayed (α = .97, M =
3.21, SD = 2.33).
To assess hope for the future of relations between Palestinians and Israelis in
reaction to the organization, participants were asked to respond to two statements adapted
from prior research (Saguy & Halperin, 2014) following the direction, When thinking

17

about this organization, I feel…: Hopeful about the future relations between Israelis and
Palestinians and Optimistic that the conflict will end (α = .88, M = 3.81, SD = 2.26).
An exploratory principal components analysis with oblique rotation using the five
items to assess anger and the two items to assess hope yielded two distinct factors
(eigenvalues > 1); this analysis indicated that all five items included to assess anger
loaded on one factor (loadings .90-.98) and the two items included to assess hope loaded
on the other factor (.83-.85).
Support for political solutions. To test effects of condition on support for political
solutions, participants were asked to indicate their support for two different types of
peace agreements: a two-state solution (more compromise to the ingroup; M = 2.62, SD =
2.44), or a one-state solution (less compromise to the ingroup; M = 4.21, SD = 2.74). See
Appendix for full-text of these measures.
Glorification of the ingroup. To assess whether the extent to which participants
glorify their ingroup moderates their reactions to peace activist organizations, participants
were asked to respond to the scales for glorification and attachment, originally developed
for use with Jewish Israelis (Roccas et al., 2006).
Specifically, participants were asked to respond to the eight items assessing
glorification from Roccas et al. (2006; α = .84, M = 5.78, SD = 1.67), including four
items designed to assess beliefs in ingroup superiority (e.g., Relative to other nations, we
are a very moral nation, Israel is better than other nations in all respects), and four items
designed to assess deference to the ingroup, (e.g., it is disloyal for Israelis to criticize
Israel, In today’s world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of our
nation). Additionally, to be able to distinguish glorification from feelings of attachment
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to the ingroup, participants were asked to respond to the eight items from Roccas et al.
(2006) assessing attachment (e.g., I love Israel; It is important for me to contribute to my
nation; α = .95, M = 7.19, SD = 1.87). Full versions of the measures are available in
Appendix.
Although an exploratory factor analysis with oblique rotation initially yielded four
factors, analysis of the scree plot indicated that only two were meaningful (the third and
fourth were at similar points on the y-axis). Thus, a second analysis was conducted
specifying only two factors, which yielded one factor including the eight items assessing
glorification (eigenvalue = 7.76; loadings .52-.77) and one factor including the eight
items assessing attachment (eigenvalue = 2.06; loadings .57-95).
Study 1 Results
Hypotheses were tested using the GLM procedure, separately for each dependent
variable, entering condition, glorification, and a two-way interaction between
glorification and condition as predictors. These analyses tested the hypothesis that
condition and glorification would interact, such that high glorifiers would react most
negatively to intergroup solidarity, whereas low glorifiers would react most positively to
intergroup solidarity. Additionally, these analyses controlled for attachment because,
without controlling for attachment, scores on glorification could reflect national identity
more broadly, rather than specifically glorification (Roccas et al., 2008) and I sought to
test for the unique effects of glorification.
Preliminary analyses using only condition as the independent variable tested
whether the experimental manipulation significantly affected scores on glorification
(moderator) or attachment (covariate). The tests revealed that the experimental
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manipulation of condition did not significantly affect glorification, F(2, 123) = .10, p =
.902, nor did it affect attachment, F(2, 123) = .73, p = .485.
Anger and Hope
Across conditions, higher levels of glorification predicted significantly more
anger, b = .64, SE = .24, t(113) = 2.67, p = .009, whereas attachment did not predict
anger, b = -.05, SE = .24, t(119) = -.19, p = .853. Contrary to hypotheses, neither the
main effect of condition F(2, 118) = 1.61, p = .204, ηP2 = .027, nor the two-way
interaction between glorification and condition, F(2, 118) = .04, p = .960, ηP2 = .001,
significantly predicted anger towards the organization.
Across conditions, higher levels of glorification predicted less hope, b = -.52, SE
= .24, t(118) = -2.21, p = .029, whereas higher levels of attachment predicted more hope,
b = .49, SE = .24, t(118) = 2.07, p = .040. Yet contrary to hypotheses, neither the twoway interaction, F(1, 118) = .90, p = .411, ηP2 = .015, nor the main effect of condition,
F(2, 118) = 1.40, p = .251, ηP2 = .023, predicted hope.
Support for Political Solutions
Analyses also tested the effect of condition, glorification, and the two-way
interaction between glorification and condition on support for political solutions. The
solution involving more compromise by the ingroup (e.g., two-state solution) was
conceptualized as support for the efforts of the activist organization, whereas the solution
involving less compromise by the ingroup (e.g., one-state solution) was conceptualized as
backlash. Thus, it was predicted that condition and glorification would interact, such that
the intergroup solidarity condition would elicit stronger support for a one-state solution
and lower support for a two-state solution among high glorifiers.
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Support for two-state solution (more compromise by the ingroup). As predicted,
across conditions, higher levels of glorification predicted less support for an outgroupfavoring solution to the conflict (i.e., two-state solution), b = -1.04, SE = .24, t(119) = 4.30, p < .001, whereas attachment did not predict support, b = .24, SE = .24, t(119) =
.99, p = .323. Again, and contrary to hypotheses, neither the main effect of condition,
F(2, 119) = .69, p = .503, ηP2 = .012, nor the two-way interaction, F(1, 119) = .18, p =
.836, ηP2 = .003, predicted support for a two-state solution.
Support for one-state solution (less compromise by the ingroup). Glorification
predicted significantly more support for a one-state solution, b = .87, SE = .28, t(119) =
3.10, p = .002, whereas attachment did not predict support, b = -.37, SE = .28, t(119) = 1.32, p = .191. Neither the main effect of condition, F(2, 119) = .97, p = .384, ηP2 = .016,
nor the two-way interaction, F(2, 119) = .43, p = .654, ηP2 = .007, predicted support for a
one-state solution.
Exploratory Analyses
Given that the analyses reported above did not reveal the predicted main or
interaction effects for group composition on anger, hope, or support for political
solutions, additional exploratory analyses were conducted. It is conceivable that the
relatively abstract scenario of imagining a hypothetical organization was not strong
enough to elicit reactions reflected in the dependent variables. Thus, additional analyses
tested whether there might be some tentative support for this model in two steps. First,
within each condition, (partial) correlational analyses tested whether glorification was
related to each mediator and outcome, controlling for attachment. Second, (bivariate)
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correlational analyses tested whether anger and hope predicted support for political
solutions.
Step 1 of Exploratory Analyses: Do glorification differentially predict outcomes in
different conditions?
Table 1 shows partial correlations between glorification and the mediators and
outcomes, and between attachment and the mediators and outcomes. Whereas the focus
of these analyses is on the correlates of glorification independent of attachment,
relationships with attachment are also presented to show that these dimensions of
identification function differently. As Table 1 shows, among participants in the
intergroup solidarity condition, glorification predicted marginally higher levels of anger.
Glorification did not significantly predict hope. Glorification predicted less support for a
two-state solution, and more support for a one-state solution. Among participants in the
ingroup only condition, glorification predicted neither anger or hope. Higher levels of
glorification marginally predicted less support for a two-state solution, and showed a
trend toward predicting support for a two-state solution. As shown in the bottom of Table
1, among participants in the outgroup only condition, glorification predicted marginally
more anger and significantly less hope. Glorification predicted less support for a twostate solution and a trend toward more support for a one-state solution.
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Table 1. Study 1 Partial correlations of glorification and attachment with mediators and
outcomes in each experimental condition.
Anger
Hope
Support for Support for
twoonestate
state
solution
solution
Intergroup Condition
Glorification partial r
.27
-.05
-.31
.40
p .073
.730
.040
.007
Attachment partial

r

-.01

.18

-.09

-.20

p

.971

.250

.570

.203

Ingroup Condition
Glorification partial r
p
Attachment partial r
p
Outgroup Condition
Glorification partial r
p
Attachment partial r

.15
.342

-.17
.257

-.27
.077

.22
.150

.013
.936

.13
.399

.13
.399

-.09
.552

.32
.069

-.42
.014

-.60
<.001

.19
.286

-.07
.693

.32
.067

.32
.070

-.06
.748

p
Partial correlations (glorification controlling for attachment, attachment controlling for
glorification) are presented in the first row, with p values in the second row.
Step 2 of exploratory analyses: Do hypothesized mediators predict the outcomes?
Although the group composition condition did not significantly predict either the
mediators or outcomes, links between the hypothesized mediators (anger and hope) and
dependent variables (support for political solutions) were tested on an exploratory basis
through bivariate correlations. In line with predictions, anger was associated with less
support for a two-state solution, r = -.33, p < .001, and more support for a one-state
solution, r = .23, p = .011. In contrast, hope was associated with more support for a two-
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state solution, r = .47, p < .001, and it did not significantly correlate with support for a
one-state solution, r = -.07, p = .448.
Study 1 Discussion
Study 1 examined whether glorification would predict hope and anger towards
peace activism, as well as support for political solutions reflecting compromise,
depending upon whether the peace activist organizations included both ingroup members
and outgroup members working together in solidarity, or only ingroup members or
outgroup members. It was predicted that glorification would positively predict anger and
support for a political solution that involved the least compromise to the ingroup, and
negatively predict hope and support for a political solution reflecting more compromise,
and that these relationships would be strongest in reference to activist organizations of
both groups working together. Contrary to predictions, analyses did not show that the
manipulation of group composition, nor the interaction between condition and
glorification predicted anger, hope, or support for political solutions to the conflict. It is
possible that these null effects for condition may have been due to the abstract nature of
the task: imagining a hypothetical peace activist organization with ingroup members and
outgroup members working together, or just ingroup members or outgroup members,
may not have been concrete enough to yield significant effects on emotions or political
solutions to an ongoing conflict.
The clearest result from Study 1 is that higher scores on glorification predicted
outcomes reflecting backlash: more anger, less hope, less support for a political solution
reflecting political compromise, and more support for a political solution suggesting less
compromise by the ingroup. Additionally, exploratory analyses indicated some support
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for the notion that glorification would predict greater anger in reaction to intergroup
solidarity, but not in reaction to activists solely from the ingroup. As such, these
supplementary analyses are consistent with the hypothesis that those who strongly glorify
their ingroup will be especially likely to react negatively to intergroup solidarity.
Together, these findings suggest that activism representing both groups working together
(intergroup solidarity) may be more likely to provoke negative responses among those
who strongly glorify the ingroup, whereas glorification may play less of a role in how
people feel towards activist organizations that include only ingroup members.
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2
Study 2 Introduction
Given concerns that the experimental manipulation in Study 1 was too abstract,
Study 2 was designed using a more concrete manipulation of group composition. Study 2
used a student sample to contextualize the activist organization around a campus setting,
framing the organization as a campus student group. The primary goal of Study 2 was to
test how the group composition of the activist organization impacted support for its
efforts, while examining anger and hope as mediators for these effects. I had predicted
that an intergroup activist organization would elicit more anger and less hope than an
ingroup activist organization, and by doing so, less support for the organization and its
activities on campus.
In contrast to measures of support for political solutions, these outcomes are
directly tied to participants’ support for the organization itself, and are not confounded
with strongly held prior beliefs regarding the conflict or political solutions to the conflict.
Political attitudes about the conflict are hard to change (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). Even
if people are open to activism to resolve the conflict and are even inclined to support their
ingroup making significant compromises for peace, they still likely disagree on what the
most sustainable permanent solution to the conflict is. By adjusting outcome measures
from Study 1 to be in direct connection to the activist organization, the measure of hope
in Study 2 reflected hope regarding the activities of the organization, rather than
appraisals of hope for future relations (e.g., as in Saguy & Halperin, 2014). The survey
still measured support for specific political solutions as in Study 1, but the focus of
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outcomes switched to support for the organizations to speak on campus and agreement
with a critique of the organizations, to more directly connect participants’ responses to
their support for activism. Additionally, Study 2 included a measure of support for
negotiations with Palestinians, to examine whether participants’ inclinations towards
negotiating might shift as a result of the experimental manipulation.
Study 2 Method
Participants and Procedure
Seventy-two participants were recruited for the study from a private university in
Israel. Data from 11 participants were excluded either for not indicating whether they
were an Israeli citizen or indicating that they were not an Israeli citizen. Data from
another four participants were excluded for indicating a religion other than Judaism, and
data from another two participants were excluded because they indicated participating in
peace demonstrations more than “seldom”.
Participants were recruited via the School of Psychology’s experimental
participation system in return for course credit. The online advertisement informed
participants that the study was about “Learning about political organizations”. Upon
consenting to the study, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions.
Participants were told about a specific (fictitious) campus organization that either
included Jewish Israelis and Palestinians working together (namely, Israelis and
Palestinians Working for a Solution; intergroup solidarity condition), or only Jewish
Israelis (namely, Israelis Working for a Solution; ingroup condition). In both conditions,
participants read that the organization aimed to promote a non-violent political solution to
the conflict to which both Israelis and Palestinians could agree. Also in both conditions,
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participants read that the organization was recently critiqued as “dangerous for its naïve
perceptions and misguided agenda.” This information was included to allow for a range
of participant responses to be deemed acceptable (e.g., from support to rejection of
activism) and to set the context for a dependent variable assessing participants’
agreement with criticism of the organization. The full English version of the text is
presented below:
The organization, (Israelis Working for a Solution/Israelis and
Palestinians Working for a Solution) is a (Jewish-Israeli/joint Jewish
Israeli and Palestinian) non-profit composed completely of (JewishIsraeli/Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian) volunteers. The organization was
founded in 1995 with the goal of promoting public support for a nonviolent political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that will be
acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians. The organization often
holds rallies in support of political negotiations and in opposition to
policies and actions they see as exacerbating the conflict, including on
university campuses. This past week, the organization was harshly
criticized in an op-ed as “dangerous for its naïve perceptions and
misguided agenda.”
Following the manipulation, all participants were presented with a scenario in
which a student wing of the organization indicated that it would like to speak at the
university. Specifically, participants read that the organization has a student wing at their
university that wishes to invite students and faculty to learn about the organization and its
goals, and that the university will decide whether to schedule this event based upon
students’ support or opposition. The English version of the text is below.
[Israelis and Palestinians Working for a Solution – or – Israelis
Working for a Solution] has a student wing at the (name of school).
They want to invite students and faculty to hear about the
organization and its goals at the Social Services Center.
The center will decide whether to schedule this or not based on students’
support or opposition.
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How much would you support scheduling this organization to present at
the Social Services Center?

An attention check administered at the end of the study indicated that many
participants did not correctly indicate the group composition of the organization they read
about. Seven participants did not correctly indicate the group composition in the
intergroup condition (with five indicating that no specific organization was specified, one
not answering the question, and one indicating that only Jewish Israelis were in the
organization) and ten participants did not correctly indicate the group composition in the
ingroup condition. Within each condition, analyses using the GLM procedure were
conducted to test whether participants’ scores on outcome measures varied significantly
depending on whether they did or did not pass the attention check. No significant
differences and only two marginal effects were observed (see Table 2). Thus, the
attention check was regarded as a general check of participants’ retention of the
information regarding group composition, rather than as a criterion for exclusion; notes
have been added to specify when different results emerge when those who did not
accurately respond to the manipulation check are excluded. Altogether, a total of 55
participants, 28 in the intergroup solidarity condition and 27 in the ingroup condition
(ages 19-35, M = 23.04, SD = 2.28; 16 men and 39 women) were included in data
analysis.1

Initially, the design for this study included two additional conditions: a ‘baseline’ condition where no
specific organization was specified, and an ‘outgroup only’ condition that included only outgroup
members. In hindsight, both of these conditions were likely confusing to participants and were therefore
dropped from the study design.
First, although the baseline condition did not mention a specific organization in the manipulation, the
scenario describing a student wing of “one of these organizations” on campus implied an actual
organization; thus, participants were left to guess the group composition of that organization. Second,
although the college has Palestinian students who are citizens of Israel, they make up a very small
proportion of the total student body, thereby reducing the believability of this manipulation.
1
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Table 2. Differences between participants who passed vs. did not pass attention check in
Study 2.
Passed
Did not
t
Attention
pass
Check
attention
M (SD)
check
M (SD)
Intergroup
Anger towards the
2.84 (1.66)
1.92
t(24) 1.20, p = .242
condition
organization
(.82)
Hope towards the
5.04 (2.30)
5.78
t(24) = -.62, p =
organization
(2.98)
.543
Support for the
5.87 (1.53)
6.36
t(24) = -.62, p =
organization to
(.76)
.543.
present on campus
Agreement with
4.56 (1.64)
4.50
t(21) = .06, p =
critique of the
(2.08)
.950
organization
Support for
5.86 (1.90)
6.19
t(22) = -.27, p =
negotiations with
(3.57)
.789
Palestinians
Support for a one3.81
2.37
t(20) = 1.39, p =
state solution with
(1.90)
(2.73)
.178
Palestinian enclaves
Support for a one6.71 (5.83)
6.67
t(24) = .03, p =
state solution
(3.05)
.975
expelling Arabs
Support for a two3.61 (1.91)
2.68
t(23) = .87, p =
state solution
(3.02)
.395
Ingroup
Anger towards the
3.69 (2.38)
3.87
t(25) = -.21, p =
condition
organization
(1.86)
.837
Hope towards the
3.53 (1.88)
3.62
t(24) = -.14, p =
organization
(1.32)
.889
Support for the
4.64 (2.28)
4.89
t(24) = -.29, p =
organization to
(1.82)
.773
present on campus
Agreement with
5.90 (2.20)
4.54
t(23) = 1.71, p =
critique of the
(1.48)
.1008
organization
Support for
5.12 (2.30)
4.98
t(24) = .17, p =
negotiations with
(1.80)
.870
Palestinians

30

Support for a onestate solution with
Palestinian enclaves
Support for a onestate solution
expelling Arabs
Support for a twostate solution

3.46
(2.34)

4.02
(2.07)

t(24) = -.62, p =
.542

5.95 (2.90)

6.13
(2.51)

t(24) = -.17, p =
.869

3.92 (2.69)

2.29
(1.37)

t(24) = 1.77, p =
.089

Measures
Following the manipulation and presentation of the scenario with the student wing
requesting to speak on campus, three sets of measures were used to assess outcomes,
concerning participants’ emotional responses of anger and hope, support for the
organization, and policy support. Unless otherwise specified, all scales in the survey
ranged from 1 (“Strongly oppose” or “Strongly disagree”) to 9 (“Strongly support” or
“Strongly oppose), with two decimal places in between.
Glorification (M = 5.03, SD = 1.18, α = .88) and attachment (M = 5.74, SD =
1.22, α = .88). Glorification and attachment were assessed through pre-screening
measures taken at the beginning of the semester, using shortened four-item versions of
the scales used in Study 1, scored on a scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7
(Strongly Agree). In an oblique rotation specifying two factors, the items for attachment
(loadings .62-.97, eigenvalue = 4.32) formed a separate scale from the items for
glorification (loadings .71-.86, eigenvalue = .97).
Anger and hope. To assess differences in anger and hope in response to the
organization, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt 12 different
emotions in randomized order, which were scored on a scale ranging from “Not at all” (1)
and “Absolutely” (9). Anger (M = 3.22, SD = 1.96, α = .96) was measured with the same
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emotion items as in Study 1. The measure of hope (M = 4.37, SD = 2.20) was changed
from Study 1 and measured with the single item hopeful. in order to better reflect an
emotional state rather than more general views of the conflict.2
Support for the student organization. Two measures assessed participants’
support for the student wing of the organization, to provide a more concrete basis for
participants’ responses. Single-item measures asked participants how much they
supported having the organization speak on campus and how much they agreed with the
critique of the organization. First, participants were asked to indicate their support or
opposition to the student wing of the organization presenting on campus (M = 5.31, SD =
1.89), on a scale ranging from “Strongly oppose” (1) and “Strongly Support” (9).
Second, participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed with the critique of the
organization as “dangerous for its naïve perceptions and misguided agenda” (M = 4.97,
SD = 1.89), on a scoring scale ranging from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 9 (“Strongly
agree”).
Support for political solutions. As in Study 1, Study 2 included measures
assessing support for a one-state solution with Palestinian enclaves (M = 3.60, SD =
2.15), and support for a two-state solution (M = 3.36, SD = 2.24). In addition, Study 2
included a more general measure of support for negotiations with Palestinians (M = 5.47,
SD = 2.14). For the negotiations measure, participants indicated on a 9-point scale the
extent to which they would describe themselves as a “Hawk” vs. “Dove” regarding
support for negotiations between the Israeli government and Palestinians, with lower
scores indicating more hawkishness and resistance to negotiations, and higher scores

2

One additional item intended to assess hope, despair (reverse-scored) was excluded from analyses
because it did not correlate strongly with the ‘hopeful’ item.”

32

indicating more dovishness and support for negotiations. Although attitudes towards the
conflict are hard to change (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011), situational factors can affect
support for negotiations (Kteily, Saguy, Sidanius, & Taylor, 2013). This general measure
of support for negotiations was added because it indicates openness to improving future
relations, whereas support for specific political solutions might have more to do with
participants’ prior political opinions, or their views about what may be realistic or
sustainable.
Study 2 Results
Analyses using the GLM procedure and controlling for attachment, tested how
condition, glorification, and the interaction between condition and glorification predicted
all mediators and outcomes.3
Anger and Hope
Participants in the intergroup solidarity condition (M = 2.66, SD = 1.56) reported
significantly lower anger relative to those in the ingroup condition (M = 3.76, SD = 2.17),
F(1, 49) = 4.82, p = .033, ηP2 = .091. Glorification predicted significantly higher levels of
anger, b = .76, SE = .29, t(48) = 2.64, p = .011, whereas attachment did not predict anger,
b = .23, SE = .30, t(48) = .77, p = .448. The interaction between condition and
glorification was not significant, F(1, 48) = .07, .794, ηP2 = .001.

3

Since the sample was heavily female, and one condition had a disproportionately high number of females
relative to the other condition, logistic regression tested whether this imbalance was statistically significant.
Analyses indicated that there were significantly fewer males in the intergroup solidarity condition (2) than
in the ingroup condition (10), b = 1.59, SE = .66, Wald Chi-Square = 5.57, p = .018. Thus, to limit the
extent to which gender presented a confound analyzing differences between conditions, an initial set of
analyses was conducted with gender as a covariate in all analyses, as well as the interaction between
condition and gender (see Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd, 2003). Since neither gender nor the interaction between
gender and condition explained significant variance in any outcome (with the exception of two marginal
interactions predicting support for negotiations and interest in joining the organization, p ≥ .09), gender and
the interaction between gender and condition were not included as predictors in the main analyses.
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At the same time, participants in the intergroup solidarity condition (M = 5.18, SD
= 2.40) reported significantly greater hope relative to those in the ingroup condition (M =
3.56, SD = 1.66), F(1, 48) = 8.81, p = .005, ηp2 = .158. Neither glorification, b = .47, SE =
.35, t(48) = 1.34, p = .186 nor attachment significantly predicted hope, b = -.41, SE = .36,
t(48) = -1.13, p = .265. Additionally, the interaction between condition and glorification
was not significant, F(1, 48) = .50, p = .483, ηp2 = .011.
Support for the Organization
Contrary to expectations, participants in the intergroup condition (M = 5.93, SD =
1.45) showed greater support for the organization to speak on campus relative to
participants in the ingroup condition (M = 4.73, SD = 2. 08), F(1, 45) = 5.00, p = .030, ηp2
=

.100. Neither glorification, b = -.56, SE = .35, t(45) =-1.60, p = .116, nor attachment b =

-.17, SE = .35, t(48) = -.47, p = .642, significantly predicted support. The interaction
between condition and glorification was not significant, F(1, 45) = .08, p = .777, ηp2 =
.002. Additionally, there was a non-significant trend for participants in the intergroup
condition (M = 4.55, SD = 1.67) to report less agreement with the critique relative to
those the ingroup condition (M = 5.36, SD = 2.03), F(1, 43) =2.16, p = .149, ηp2 = .048;
no other main or interaction effects were significant.
Support for Political Solutions
There was a trend for those in the intergroup solidarity condition (M = 5.91, SD =
2.16) to express more identification as a “dove”, supporting negotiations with
Palestinians, relative to the ingroup condition (M = 5.06, SD = 2.08), F(1, 46) = 2.11, p =
.153, ηp2 = .045. Glorification did not significantly predict identification as a “dove”, b =
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-.12, SE = .36, t(48) = -.33, p = .742, nor did the interaction between glorification and
condition, F(4, 45) = 1.91, p = .173, ηp2 = .041.
The experimental manipulation did not significantly affect participants’ support
for any of the political solutions. Neither condition, F(4, 46) = .06, p = .805, ηp2 = .001,
nor glorification, b = -.03, SE = .38, t(46) = -.08, p = .934, nor the interaction between
condition and glorification, F(4, 46) = .00, p = ..978, ηp2 = .00 significantly predicted
support for a one-state solution. Similarly, neither condition, F(4, 46) = .06, p = .813, ηp2
= .001, nor glorification, b = .11, SE = .40, t(48) = .27, p = .789, nor the interaction
between condition and glorification, F(4, 46) = .14, p = ..712, ηp2 = .003, significantly
predicted support for a two-state solution.
Mediation Analyses
Analyses of the condition effects above suggested that participants in Study 2
reacted somewhat more receptively to an intergroup rather than ingroup-only activist
organization in the university context; they reported feeling less anger, more hope , and
were more supportive of allowing it to speak on campus. Mediation analyses tested
whether the intergroup condition, as contrasted to the ingroup condition, affected support
for the organization speaking on campus indirectly via its effects on anger and hope. All
analyses controlled for glorification, attachment, and the interaction between glorification
and condition. I used Hayes’ Process (2013) Model 4 with 5,000 bootstrapping samples
for each analysis, using a dummy variable representing the condition (with a value of ‘0’
for those in the ingroup condition and a value of ‘1’ for those in the intergroup
condition).

35

Predicting support for the organization speaking on campus. The intergroup
condition increased support for allowing the organization on campus indirectly via
(reduction in) anger and (increase in) hope as mediators was significant, b = .39, boot SE
= .26, [LLCI: .0454, ULCI: 1.1299], and b = .40, boot SE = .25, [LLCI: .10688, ULCI:
1.0787], respectively. The total effect was significant, b = .79, boot SE = .34, [LLCI:
.2480, ULCI: 1.6006]. The direct effect was not significant once the mediators were
taken into account, b = .19, boot SE = .46, p = .41, p = .687.
Exploratory Analyses
As in Study 1, additional exploratory analyses tested whether glorification
(controlling for attachment) would correlate with the mediators and outcomes
differentially when participants in the intergroup condition and the ingroup condition are
treated as separate samples. Table 4 presents partial correlations between glorifications
(partialling out attachment) and mediators and outcomes, and between attachment
(partialling out glorification) and mediators and outcomes. Although correlates of
glorification are the focus of analyses, correlates of attachment are reported to show how
glorification is related to mediators and outcomes differently from attachment. As Table
3 shows, among participants in the intergroup condition, glorification significantly
predicted more anger and less support for having the organization present at the
university, and marginally less support for a two-state solution (which would involve
compromise by the ingroup). There was also a trend for glorification to predict stronger
agreement with the criticism of the organization. In contrast, among participants in the
ingroup condition, glorification was not significantly related to any of the mediators or
outcomes.
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Table 3. Study 2 Partial correlations of glorification with mediators and outcomes in each
experimental condition.
Anger

Hope

Presenting

Criticism

Negotiations

Two-state

One-state

Glorification partial r
p

.58
.010

-.11
.663

-.60
.007

.38
.104

-.37
.121

-.43
.067

-.18
.454

Attachment partial

-.29
.235

.16
.523

.48
.037

-.14
.562

.28
.249

.46
.047

-.05
.853

-.22
.321

-.05
.827

-.27
.224

.06
.798

-.09
.706

.32
.153

-.22
.325

-.53
.012

.01
.975

Intergroup Condition

r
p

Ingroup Condition
Glorification partial r
p

.34
.118

.07
.749

Attachment partial r
p

.18
.423

-.47
.026

-.23
.296

Partial correlations (glorification controlling for attachment, attachment controlling for
glorification) are presented in the first row, with p values in the second row.
Also as in Study 1, bivariate correlations examined relations between the
mediators (anger and hope) and outcomes. As shown in Table 4, anger was significantly
associated with less support for having the organization present at the university, more
agreement with criticism of the organization, and less support for negotiations with
Palestinians (i.e., identification as ‘dove’). In contrast, hope positively predicted more
support for having the organization present at the university, more support for
negotiations with Palestinians, and more support for a two-state solution.
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Table 4. Study 2 Bivariate correlations of anger and hope with outcomes across
conditions.
Support

Criticism Negotiations

for

Two- Onestate

state

presenting
Anger bivariate r
p
Hope bivariate r
p

-.56

.45

-.41

-.15

.21

<.001

.001

.003

.308

.135

.47

-.22

.41

.34

-.21

<.001

.142

.003

.015 .142

Study 2 Discussion
Study 2 tested how an activist organization composed of ingroup members and
outgroup members working together, as compared to an activist organization composed
of only ingroup members, would predict emotions, support for the organization, and
support for political solutions, and whether glorification with the ingroup might moderate
the effects. In Study 2, participants were most receptive towards the intergroup, rather
than the ingroup-only, activist organization. The effects of the intergroup condition on
support for allowing the organization to present on campus was explained via decrease in
anger and an increase in hope.
Although there were not significant interaction effects involving glorification,
supplemental exploratory analyses indicated that glorification was positively related to
anger, and negatively related to outcomes reflecting support for the organization among
participants in the intergroup condition. These tentative findings converge with those
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obtained in Study 1, suggesting that higher levels of glorification may lead people to
respond with backlash rather than support to activist organizations representing
intergroup solidarity. A limitation of this study is that such effects for glorification were
not observed in the GLM analyses testing its interaction with condition; this may have
been due to the low power of the sample, which could not be controlled given challenges
in recruiting students in the private university setting. For this reason, Study 3 again used
a survey company to collect participants from a national sample.
Together, findings from the first two studies suggest that representations of
intergroup solidarity may build support for peace activist organizations (Study 2), yet
(tentatively) higher levels of glorification may instead lead to backlash against activist
organizations that enact intergroup solidarity (Studies 1 and 2). Although I encountered
challenges in recruiting undergraduate participants from a private Israeli university in
Study 2, findings from Study 2 are nonetheless informative, in that they show that the
group composition of activist organizations can affect Jewish Israelis’ responses to their
efforts, while underlining the importance of testing their effects as moderated by
glorification.
This main effect of condition in Study 2 was not expected, whereby the intergroup
organization decreased anger, and increased hope and support for allowing the
organization to present on campus. Rather than presuming that intergroup solidarity itself
led to this main effect, a second factor may have played a role in relation to both
intergroup solidarity and glorification. As noted earlier in this dissertation, people who
score high in glorification are especially likely to be sensitive to activism in the form of
intergroup solidarity, because this solidarity may threaten their views of the ingroup as
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superior and suggest that the ingroup may need to address its own immoral behavior
(Roccas et al., 2006; Roccas et al., 2008). Implicit in this analysis is the possibility that
people high in glorification are sensitive to criticism of the ingroup. Whereas past
research has shown that those who strongly glorify the ingroup are sensitive to
information that threatens the moral image of their ingroup (Leidner et al., 2010), it has
not been directly tested how they may be sensitive to direct criticism of the ingroup.
Studies 1-2 did not directly manipulate whether the activist organizations were
critical of the ingroup, yet it is possible that perceived criticism of the ingroup may have
influenced participants’ responses. In particular, Israeli activists advocating for change in
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are advocating either directly for changes to their
government’s policies or for more awareness regarding the consequences of those
policies (see Naise et al., 2014; Perry, 2011). It would have been plausible for
participants to presume that the intergroup organization would have been critical of both
groups. Indeed, at least one of the most prominent activist organizations in this context
that include Israelis and Palestinians working together is critical of violence on either side
(e.g., Combatants for Peace; see Perry, 2011); in contrast, an Israeli-only activist
organization tends to center its critique on its own ingroup (e.g., Breaking the Silence). In
a context of intergroup conflict, learning about a member of the outgroup criticizing their
own group can increase hope about the conflict ending and, in so doing, openness to
hearing their perspective (Saguy & Halperin, 2014).
Although people are generally less sensitive to members of their ingroup who
critique the ingroup than to members of the outgroup who do so (e.g., Hornsey et al.,
2002), in contexts of intergroup conflict, the extra allowance for ingroup members to

40

criticize the ingroup disappears (Ariyanto et al., 2012). If the intergroup condition elicited
support with the presumption that this intergroup organization was critical of both
groups, it would add to past research on forms of indirect exposure and group-based
criticism (Ariyanto et al., 2012; Saguy & Halperin, 2014), by showing that outgroup
members joining with ingroup members to criticize both together may buffer the negative
impact of the ingroup receiving criticism.
Presuming that the intergroup organization was critical of just the ingroup could
also have divergent consequences. If participants did not presume that the intergroup
organization was critical of both groups, and presumed instead that it was critical of just
the ingroup, the intergroup organization may have elicited backlash; not only would
ingroup members be criticizing the ingroup, but they would be joining members of the
outgroup to do it. If support for the intergroup activist organization is indeed due to
participants’ presumption that the intergroup organization is critical of both groups, this
would help explain why some effects observed in the previous studies (e.g., agreement
with the critique, support for negotiations) were less clear and only emerged as trends.
Manipulating both the group composition of the activist organization and the
target of its criticism allows for a more direct test of how intergroup solidarity may
induce support for or backlash to peace activism depending upon who is (are) perceived
to be the target(s) of criticism, and how glorification moderates these effects. Put another
way, the way in which glorification predicts support for activist organizations may
depend both on the group composition and the target of criticism. Study 3 was designed
to test these possibilities.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 3
Study 3 Introduction
Study 3 was designed to build on the findings of Study 2 by directly testing how
group composition of the activist organization (both ingroup members and outgroup
members vs. ingroup members only) leads to support or backlash for the organization
depending upon the perceived target of its criticism (both ingroup and outgroup, or
ingroup only), and whether or how glorification further moderates these effects (threeway interaction). I expected that the intergroup composition should elicit higher levels of
support when the activist organization is critical of both groups, and that it should elicit
the most backlash when it is critical of only the ingroup. Moreover, I expected that
glorification should generally predict more backlash toward the activist organization, and
particularly when both groups are working together in solidarity and when only the
ingroup is the target of criticism.
Additionally, Study 3, like Study 1, employed a national sample. Using a national
sample enabled more participants to be recruited, to ensure that there would be acceptable
statistical power for testing hypotheses. In particular, the larger sample allowed for
testing whether participants’ glorification of Israel would moderate how either the group
composition or target of criticism, or interaction between the two conditions (e.g., threeway interaction) would affect emotions and support for activism and political solutions,
and whether the hypothesized indirect effects of the interacting conditions (via anger and
hope) depended open glorification (e.g., moderated mediation with two moderators of the
indirect effect). I expected that those who strongly glorify the ingroup should be
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particularly sensitive to criticism when the ingroup is the only target of criticism, and
should also react negatively to instances of intergroup solidarity, whereby the ingroup is
working with the outgroup. In contrast, low glorifiers should be relatively less sensitive
to having the ingroup be the only target of criticism, and may respond more positively to
instances of intergroup solidarity when the ingroup and outgroup are working together.
However, both low and high glorifiers still would likely react aversely to both groups
working together when the target of their criticism remains exclusively the ingroup.
Study 3 Method
Participants and Procedure
Based on a power analysis4 for a two-factor study examining fixed effects and
interactions and expecting medium effect sizes, 301 Jewish Israeli participants were
recruited to participate in Study 3 via the online company Midgam
(https://www.midgampanel.com). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four
conditions reading about activist organizations, differing according to two factors: the
group composition and target of criticism. Each factor had two levels within a 2 (group
composition: intergroup solidarity vs. ingroup only) x 2 (target of criticism: both ingroup
and outgroup members vs. only ingroup members) factorial design.
Upon consenting to the study, participants were presented with one of four texts
that varied along two factors: (1) whether it described an organization called “Israelis and
Palestinians Working for a Solution” (intergroup solidarity condition) or whether it
described an organization called “Israelis Working for a Solution” (ingroup only

4

The program GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was used to conduct the power analysis
with an ANOVA with four groups, main effects, and an interaction, expecting slightly smaller than medium
effect sizes.
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condition); and (2) whether the organization was reported to be critical of “Israeli and
Palestinian policies and actions they see as exacerbating the conflict” (criticism towards
both ingroup and outgroup) or of “Israeli policies and actions they see as exacerbating the
conflict” (e.g., criticism towards the ingroup only). These procedures allowed group
composition to be manipulated in the same way as was done for Study 2, while also
adding the factor of target of criticism. Moreover, like Study 2, across conditions the text
in Study 3 read “The organization was founded in 1995 with the goal of stopping such
policies and actions, and promoting public support for a non-violent political solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that will be acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians.
They hold rallies to oppose these policies and actions, and to support political
negotiations.”
Rather than presenting an organization with a student wing on campus as in Study
2, Study 3 presented participants with an organization intending to organize events in
areas of Israel near the participants; participants were further informed that local
governments will use the survey as a poll of public opinion showing support or
opposition to the organization using public spaces for this purpose. The English version
of the text of this scenario is provided below.
[Israelis and Palestinians Working for a Solution – or – Israelis Working
for a Solution] wants to organize events to discuss the conflict and
potential solutions at public venues across all of Israel, including public
libraries, universities, and parks.
Local governments are deciding whether to allow [Israelis and
Palestinians Working for a Solution – or – Israelis Working for a
Solution] to organize for this purpose. Since a representative sample of
Israel’s population is taking this survey, local governments are using the
opinions of Israelis in each locality taking this survey to decide whether to
allow the organization to present in public venues.
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Of the participants recruited for this study, one participant was excluded based on
their identification as Christian, and another eight were excluded because they indicated
that they had participated in demonstrations to promote peace between Israelis and
Palestinians more than “seldom”. In an effort to omit careless responses that are common
in online data collection (see Curran, 2016) another 60 participants were excluded for
failing an attention check at the end of the study asking about the group composition of
the activist organization. These included 20 participants in the intergroup condition (5
where both groups were targets of criticism, 15 where only the ingroup was the target of
criticism) and 40 participants in the ingroup only condition (18 where both groups were
targets of criticism and 22 where only the ingroup was the target of criticism), leaving a
total of 232 participants for data analysis (109 men and 123 women; ages 18-64, M =
39.28 years, SD = 13.18).5
As in Studies 1-2, the attention check was located at the end of the study.
Although I had considered moving the attention check earlier, soon after the experimental
manipulations, I decided to keep it at the end of the survey out of concern that asking
specific questions about group composition directly after the manipulation would prompt
participants’ suspicions regarding the study’s purpose. However, in addition to the
multiple-choice attention checks, a continuous measure of participants’ perceptions of

5

There were no significant differences across any of the conditions between those excluded and not
excluded for the group composition attention check on the outcomes of anger, hope, support for the
organization presenting, or agreement with the critique in any condition. Within the condition with both
groups criticizing both groups, there was a trend for those excluded to be less supportive of a one-state
solution, p = .164. Within the condition where the ingroup criticizes both groups, there was a trend for
participants who were excluded to be less agreeing with the critique, p = .189, and less supportive of a onestate solution, p = .129. Also within the condition where the ingroup criticizes the ingroup, those who were
excluded were significantly more supportive of a two-state solution, p = .038, and there was a trend for
those excluded to be more supportive of a one-state solution. Within the condition where only the ingroup
criticizes the ingroup, those who were excluded were significantly more supportive of a two-state solution,
p = .038.
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who the organization was critical of (Israel and Israeli policies and groups or Palestinians
and Palestinian groups) was included directly following the manipulation, and used as a
check of whether the manipulation affected perceived target of criticism successfully.
Criticism of the ingroup and outgroup. An exploratory principal components
analysis with oblique rotation showed that seven items involving ingroup criticism (e.g.,
criticizing the policies and actions of Israel, criticizing the Israeli government, criticizing
the terror perpetrated by Israelis; loadings .67-.94) formed a distinct factor from four
items revolving around outgroup criticism (e.g., criticizing the policies and actions of
Palestinians, criticizing the Palestinian organizations who use violence against Israel,
criticizing terrorism committed by Palestinians; loadings .61-.94). Both the 7-item
measure of ingroup criticism (M = 6.79, SD = 1.68, α = .92) and the 4-item measure of
outgroup criticism (M = 3.76, SD = 2.04, α = .88) formed reliable scales.
Results of check for perceived criticism. To check whether the manipulation for
target of criticism was effective, a GLM tested main effects of group composition and
target of criticism on the two measures assessing participants’ perceptions of Israel as the
target of criticism and of Palestinians as the target of criticism. As expected, framing both
groups (M = 4.27, SD = 2.05) rather than just the ingroup (M = 3.24, 1.90) as the target of
criticism significantly increased the perception that the organization is critical of
Palestinians, F(2, 229) = 15.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .064. Framing the organization as critical
of both groups (M = 6.46, SD = 1.59) rather than just the ingroup (M = 7.15, SD = 1.61)
also reduced the extent to which participants perceived the organization as critical of
Israel, F(2, 229) = 10.25, p = .002, ηp2 = .043. Surprisingly, both groups working together
(M = 6.96, SD = 1.59) rather than just the ingroup working alone (M = 6.56, SD = 1.79)
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marginally increased the perception that the organization is critical of Israel, F(2, 229) =
3.12, p = .067, ηp2 = .015; both groups working together (M = 3.57, SD = 2.01), rather
than just the ingroup working alone (M = 4.04, SD = 2.06) marginally decreased the
perception that the organization is critical of Palestinians, F(2, 229) = 3.12, p = .079, ηp2
= .013.
Measures
Study 3 included the same measures used in Study 2 to assess anger (M = 5.35,
SD = 2.36, α = .95), hope (M = 3.33, SD = 2.48), support for having the organization
present (M = 3.95, SD = 2.61), and agreement with the critique of the organization (M =
6.28, SD = 2.31). Study 3 also included the same measures as Study 2 to assess support
for political solutions, including support for a one-state solution with Palestinian enclaves
(M = 4.13, SD = 2.42) and support for a two-state solution (M = 2.72, SD = 2.29), and
support for negotiations with Palestinians (M = 4.67, SD = 2.33).
Glorification (M = 5.76, SD = 1.64, α = .84) and attachment (M = 7.44, SD =
1.51, α = .89). To assess whether glorification moderated either how the group
composition, target of criticism, or the interaction between the two affected outcomes,
eight items assessed participants’ glorification and, in a separate block, seven items
assessed participants’ attachment (one of eight items excluded based on cross-loading).
These items were included after assessing all other measures of primary interest, As in
Studies 1-2, attachment was used as a covariate in all analyses with glorification.
Support for allowing the organization to present (M = 3.95, SD = 2.61). In
response to the scenario describing local governments’ intention to use participants’ input
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as part of their decision, a single item measured participants’ support for allowing the
organization to present ranging from 1 (“Strongly Oppose”) to 9 (“Strongly Support”).
Study 3 Results
Before conducting main analyses, a GLM model with group composition and
target of criticism as independent variables tested whether glorification and attachment
(moderator and covariate, respectively) were affected by condition; neither were affected
by either condition, ps > .500. GLM models tested group composition, target of criticism,
glorification, and their interactions as predictors for each outcome. Glorification and
attachment were each standardized so that the mean was zero, and a value of ‘1’ indicated
those participants with scores one standard deviation above mean, and a value of ‘-1’
indicated those participants with scores one standard deviation below the mean. Thus,
“high glorifiers” refers to those one standard deviation above the mean on glorification,
whereas “low glorifiers” refers to those one standard deviation below the mean on
glorification.
Interactions were decomposed examining glorification as an independent variable
predicting mediators and outcomes differentially across conditions; in the figures that
follow, significant slopes (p < .05) are indicated with an asterisk, and marginal slopes (p
≤ .10) are indicated with a plus sign. In addition, contrasts between conditions among
low glorifiers and between conditions among high glorifiers are noted in graphs of threeway interactions when the p-value of the contrasts is .15 or lower. Three-way interactions
were decomposed using Hayes’ Process Model 3 (2013).
Anger

48

Group composition did not significantly affect anger as a main effect, F(1, 223) =
0.00, p = .984, ηp2 = .000. However, target of criticism F(8, 223) = 4.97, p = .027 ηp2 =
.022 did affect anger. Anger was higher when the ingroup was the only target of criticism
(M = 5.70, SD = 2.40) rather than when both groups were the target of criticism, (M =
5.01, SD = 2.27). The two-way interaction between group composition and target of
criticism was not significant, F(1, 223) = .29, p = .593, ηp2 = .001.
Glorification significantly predicted higher levels of anger, b = .75, SE = .18,
t(223) = 4.26, p < .001, whereas attachment did not significantly predict anger, b = .16,
SE = .17, t(223) = .93, p = .351. Moreover, glorification significantly interacted with
group composition F(8, 223) = 4.98, p = .027, ηp2 = .022; glorification predicted
significantly more anger when both groups were working together, b = 1.08, SE = .20,
t(223) = 5.29, p < .001, but only marginally when the ingroup was working alone, b =
.43, SE = .25, t(223) = 1.70, p = .091. Likewise, glorification significantly interacted with
target of criticism, F(1, 223) = 5.63, p = .019, ηp2 = .025; glorification predicted
significantly more anger when the target of criticism was just the ingroup, b = 1.10, SE =
.22, t(223) = 5.00, p < .001, but only marginally when the target of criticism was both
groups, b = .41, SE = .24, t(223) = 1.71, p = .089.
A significant three-way interaction between group composition, target of
criticism, and glorification qualified these two-way interactions, F(8, 223) = 4.39, p =
.037, ηp2 = .019. The two-way interaction between glorification and group composition
was significant when both groups were the target of criticism, b = 1.26, SE = .44, t(223) =
2.88, p = .004, but not when the target of criticism was only the ingroup, b = .04, SE =
.38, t(223) = .099, p = .922. As Figure 2 shows, glorification predicted significantly
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higher levels of anger when the ingroup is working alone and criticizes only the ingroup,
b = 1.08, SE = .31, t(223) = .31, p = .001, when both groups are working together and
criticizing only the ingroup, b = 1.12, SE = .27, t(223) = 4.09, p < .001. At the same
time, glorification predicted significantly higher levels of anger when both groups are
working together and criticizing both groups, b = 1.04, SE = .26, t(223) = 3.93, p < .001,
but not when the ingroup is working alone and criticizing both groups, b = -.23, SE = .37,
t(223) = -.60, p = .547.6
Figure 2. Glorification predicting anger across conditions of group composition and
target of criticism.
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The three-way interaction is not significant when not excluding participants based on the group
composition attention check, p = .237.
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Hope. Neither group composition, F(1, 223) = 1.59, p = .208, ηp2 = .007, nor
target of criticism F(1, 223) = 2.19, p = .140, ηp2 = .010, significantly predicted hope as
main effects.
Glorification did not significantly predict hope, b = -.24, SE = .19, t(223) = -1.22,
p = .223, whereas attachment did predict significantly less hope b = -.41, SE = .19, t(223)
= -.41, SE = .19, t(223) = -2.13, p = .034. However, the two-way interaction between
glorification and group composition, F(1, 223) = 6.55, p = .011, ηp2 = .029 was
significant. With both groups working together, glorification significantly predicted less
hope, b = -.65, SE = .22, t(223) = -2.89, p = .004. However, when the ingroup was
working alone, glorification did not significantly predict hope, b = .17, SE = .28, t(223) =
.63, p = .532. Additionally, the interaction between glorification and target of criticism
was also significant, F(1, 223) = 10.31, p = .002, ηp2 = .044. When both groups were the
target of criticism, glorification did not significantly predict hope, b = .28, SE = .26,
t(223) = 1.06, p = .288. In contrast, when the target of criticism was only the ingroup,
glorification predicted significantly less hope, b = -.75, SE = .24, t(223) = -3.11, p = .002.
Moreover, the three-way interaction between glorification, group composition,
and target of criticism qualified these two-way interactions to predict hope, F(1, 223) =
4.52, p = .035, ηp2 = .020. The interaction between glorification and group composition
was significant when both groups were the target of criticism, b = -1.50, SE = .48, t(223)
= -3.12, p = .002, but not when the target of criticism was only the ingroup, b = -.14, SE =
.42, t(223) = -.32, p = .746. As Figure 3 shows, glorification significantly predicted less
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hope when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, b = -.68, SE =
.34, t(223) p = .046, and when both groups were working together and criticizing only the
ingroup, b = -.82, SE = .30, t(223) = -2.73, p = .007. However, glorification predicted
higher levels of hope when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing both groups, b
= 1.03, SE = .41, t(223) = 2.51, p = .013, while glorification was not a significant
predictor of hope when both groups were working together and criticizing both groups, b
= -.47, SE = .29, t(223) = -1.63, p = .104.7
Figure 3. Glorification predicting hope across conditions of group composition
and target of criticism.
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Support for the Organization
Neither group composition, F(8, 223) = .69, p = .408, ηp2 = .003, nor target of
criticism, F(8, 223) = .72, p = .399, ηp2 = .003, significantly predicted support as main
effects. The two-way interaction between group composition and target of criticism was
also not significant, F(8, 223) = .01, p = .920, ηp2 = .000.
Glorification significantly predicted less support for having the organization
speak, b = -1.03, SE = .20, t(223) = -5.25, p < .001, whereas attachment did not predict
support for having the organization speak, b = .03, SE = .19, t(223) = .14, p = .892. The
two-way interaction between glorification and group composition was not significant,
F(1, 223) = 2.23, p = .137, ηp2 = .010, while the two-way interaction between
glorification and target of criticism was marginally significant, F(1, 223) = 3.55, p =
.061, ηp2 = .016. Glorification predicted less support most strongly when only the ingroup
was the target of criticism, b = -1.34, SE = .25, t(223) = 5.46, p < .001; glorification also
predicted less support when both groups were the target of criticism, but somewhat less
strongly, b = -.73, SE = .27, t(223) = -2.74, p = .007.
These results were qualified by a significant three-way interaction between
glorification, target of criticism, and group composition, F(1, 223) = 4.80, p = .030, ηp2 =
.021.8 As Figure 4 shows, glorification significantly predicts less support when the
ingroup is working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, b = -1.45, SE = .35, t(223) = 4.20, p < .001, and when both groups are working together and criticizing just the

8

The three-way interaction became marginal when not excluding participants based on the group
composition attention check, p = .058.
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ingroup, b = -1.23, SE = .30, t(223) = -4.02, p < .001. Glorification also predicts less
support when both groups are working together and criticizing both groups, b = -1.33, SE
= .29, t(223) = -4.51, p < .001, but not when the ingroup is working alone and criticizing
both groups, b = -.13, SE = .42, t(223) = -.30, p = .761.
Figure 4. Glorification predicting support for organization presenting across conditions
group composition and target of criticism.
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Agreement with Critique of the Organization
Neither group composition, nor target of criticism significantly affected
agreement with the critique as main effects, ps > .500. Glorification significantly
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predicted higher levels of agreement with the critique, b = .52, SE = .18, t(223) = 2.85, p
= .005, and b = .34, SE = .18, t(223) = 1.90, p = .059, respectively. None of the two-way
interactions were significant, ps > .500. However, there was a significant three-way
interaction between glorification, target of criticism, and group composition, F(1, 223) =
5.38, p = .021, ηp2 = .024.9 The two-way interaction between group composition and
glorification is significant when only the ingroup is the target of criticism, b = -.84, SE =
.40, t(223) = -2.09, p = .038, but not when both groups are the target of criticism, b = .58,
SE = .46, t(223) = 1.26, p = .210. As Figure 5 shows, glorification significantly predicts
more agreement with the critique when the ingroup is working alone and criticizing only
the ingroup, b = .95, SE = .32, t(223) = 2.93, p = .004, or when both groups work together
and are criticizing both groups, b = .81, SE = .28, t(223) = 2.94, p = .004, but is not
significant when both groups work together and criticize only the ingroup, b = .11, SE =
.28, t(223) = .38, p = .708. Consistent with the model predicting anger and support for the
organization presenting, glorification is not a significant predictor when the ingroup
works alone and criticizes both groups, b = .24, SE = .39, t(223) = .60, p = .547.

9

The three-way interaction became marginal when not excluding participants based on the group
composition attention check, p = .058.
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Figure 5. Glorification predicting agreement with critique across levels of group
composition and target of criticism.
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Support for Political Solutions
Support for a two-state solution. Neither group composition nor target of criticism
affected support for a two-state solution, ps > .300. Glorification significantly predicted
less support, b = -.88, SE = .17, t(223) = -5.07, p < .001, while attachment did not
significantly predict support, b = -.25, SE = .17, t(223) = -1.46, p = .147. None of the
two-way or three-way interactions were significant, ps > .500.
Support for a one-state solution. Group composition did not predict support for a
one-state solution, F(1, 223) = .26, p = .213. However, framing the target of criticism as
both groups (M = 4.23, SD = 2.51), rather than just the ingroup (M = 3.99, SD = 2.28)
increased support for a one-state solution, F(1, 223) = 3.99, p = .047, ηp2 = .018.
Glorification significantly predicted more support, b = .64, SE = .20, t(223) = 3.21, p =
.002; attachment did not predict support, b = -.10, SE = .20, t(223) = -.51, p = .609. There
was a trend towards a two-way interaction between glorification and group composition,
F(1, 223) = 2.61, p = .108, ηp2 = .012. None of the other two-way or three-way
interactions were significant, ps > .500.
Support for negotiations with Palestinians. Neither the main effect of group
composition nor the main effect of target of criticism significantly affected support for
negotiations, ps > .130. Glorification significantly predicted less support for negotiations,
b = -.65, SE = .19, t(223) = -3.50, p < .001, whereas attachment did not predict support
for negotiations, b = -.07, SE = .18, t(223) = -.36, p = .721. None of the two-way
interactions were significant, ps > .300. However, the three-way interaction between
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glorification, target of criticism, and group composition was significant, F(1, 223) = 4.29,
p = .040, ηp2 = .019. The two-way interaction between glorification and group
composition becomes significant when both groups are the target of criticism, b = -.93,
SE = .46, t(223) = -2.01, p = .045, but is not significant when just the ingroup is the target
of criticism, b = .34, SE = .41, t(223) = .847, p = .398. As Figure 6 shows, glorification
significantly predicts less support for negotiations when the ingroup is working alone and
criticizing only the ingroup, b = -.86, SE = .33, t(223) = -2.64, p = .009, and when both
groups are working together and criticizing both groups, b = -1.08, SE = .28, t(223) = 3.88, p < .001. However, when both groups are working together and criticizing only the
ingroup, glorification marginally predicts support for negotiations, b = -.52, SE = .29,
t(223) = -1.80, p = .073, and glorification does not significantly predict support for
negotiations when the ingroup is working alone and criticizing both groups, b = -.15, SE
= .39, t(223) = -.37, p = .709.
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Figure 6. Glorification predicting support for negotiations across conditions.
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Moderated Mediation Analyses
For each dependent variable whereby group composition, target of criticism, and
glorification significantly interacted, moderated mediation analyses tested whether
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glorification predicted outcomes differentially across conditions because of
glorification’s differential effects on anger and hope across conditions. Model 12 of
Hayes’s (2013) Process with 95% confidence intervals and 5,000 bootstrapping samples
tested the hypothesis that differences in levels of hope and anger among low and high
glorifiers explained the interactions between group composition and target of criticism in
predicting (a) support for having the organization speak (b) agreement with the critique
and (c) support for negotiations. For each of these outcomes, glorification was treated as
the independent variable, with group composition as the first moderator (coding the
ingroup as ‘0’ and both groups working together as ‘1’), and target as the second the
moderator (coding the ingroup as ‘0’ and both as ‘1’). As in all GLM analyses,
attachment was included as a covariate.
Predicting support for having the organization speak. The moderated indirect
effect of the three-way interaction was significant via both anger (indirect effect of
highest order interaction), b = -.53, boot SE = .29, [LLCI: -1.1635, ULCI: -.0363] and
hope (indirect effect of highest order interaction), b = -.50, boot SE = .25, [LLCI: 1.0804, ULCI: -.0771]. Glorification decreased support indirectly via (increasing) anger
when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, b = -.44, boot SE =
.15, [LLCI: -.7861, ULCI: -.2014], when both groups were working together and
criticizing only the ingroup, b = -.46, SE = .15, [LLCI: -.8274, ULCI: -.2156], and when
both groups were working together and criticizing both groups, b = -.43, boot SE = .14,
[LLCI: -.7311, ULCI: -.1963], but it was not significant when the ingroup was working
alone and criticizing both groups, b = .09, boot SE = .17, [LLCI: -.2692, ULCI: .3908].
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The indirect effect via hope was likewise significant when the ingroup was
working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, b = -.27, boot SE = .15, [LLCI: -.6149,
ULCI: -.0232], when both groups were working together and criticizing only the ingroup,
b = -.32, boot SE = .13, [LLCI: -.6234, ULCI: -.1109]. The indirect effect via hope was
not significant when both groups were working together and criticizing both groups, b = .18, boot SE = .12, [LLCI: -.4544, ULCI: .0380], and it was significant in the opposite
direction when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing both groups, b = .40, boot
SE = .21, [LLCI: .0082, ULCI: .8211].
Predicting agreement with the critique. The moderated indirect effect of the
three-way interaction was significant via both anger, (indirect effect of highest order
interaction) b = .50, boot SE = .24, [LLCI: .0527, ULCI: 1.0092] and hope, (indirect
effect of highest order interaction) b = .37, boot SE = .21, [LLCI: .0134, ULCI: .8217].
Glorification increased agreement indirectly via (increased) anger when the ingroup was
working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, b = .44, boot SE = .13, [LLCI: . 2051,
ULCI: .7114], when both groups were working together and criticizing only the ingroup,
b = .45, boot SE = .13, [LLCI: .2245, ULCI: .7370], and when both groups were working
together and criticizing both groups, b = .42, boot SE = .12, [LLCI: .2069, ULCI: .6839].
This indirect effect was not significant, however, when the ingroup was working alone
and criticizing both groups, b = -.09, boot SE = .16, [LLCI: -.3840, ULCI: .2558].
The indirect effect via hope was significant when the ingroup was working alone
and criticizing only the ingroup, b = .18, boot SE = .10, [LLCI: .0130, ULCI:.4278],
when both groups were working together and criticizing only the ingroup, b = .22, boot
SE = .09, [LLCI: .0806, ULCI: .4291]. The indirect effect via hope was not significant
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when both groups were working together and criticizing both groups, b = .13, boot SE =
.08, [LLCI: -.0161, ULCI: .3165], and it was significant in the opposite direction when
the ingroup was working alone and criticizing both groups, b = -.28, boot SE = .15,
[LLCI: -.5967, ULCI: -.0163].
Predicting support for negotiations with Palestinians. The indirect effect of the
three-way interaction on support for negotiations via anger was significant, (indirect
effect of highest order interaction) b = -.44, boot SE = .22, [LLCI: -.9643, ULCI: -.0730],
yet the indirect effect via hope was not (indirect effect of highest order interaction), b = .15, boot SE = .15, [LLCI: -.6062, ULCI: .0251]. Glorification predicted support for
negotiations by increasing anger when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing
only the ingroup, b = -.39, boot SE = .13, [LLCI: -.7134, ULCI: -.1646], when both
groups were working together and criticizing only the ingroup, b = -.40, boot SE = .13,
[LLCI: -.7162, ULCI: -.1822], and when both groups were working together and
criticizing both groups, b = -.37, boot SE = .12, [LLCI: -.6417, ULCI: -.1681], but not
when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing both groups, b = .08, boot SE = .15,
[LLCI: -.2203, ULCI: .3731].
Study 3 Discussion
Study 3 tested how the group composition of a peace activist organization and the
perceived target of its criticism might predict support for the organization and its
activities, and how glorification is likely to moderate these effects. Study 3 demonstrated
that support for the activist organization depended not only on its composition and
perceived target(s) of its criticism, but on how much participants glorified the ingroup.
Glorification becomes especially (positively) predictive of anger and (negatively) hope
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when both groups are working together, and when the ingroup is the only target of
criticism. In the cases of both anger and hope, spreading criticism to both groups
attenuates the impact of glorification. When the ingroup is working alone to criticize both
groups, the relationship between glorification and hope reverses, such that higher levels
of glorification predict more hope. The outcome of support for the organization
presenting follows a different but similar pattern; across conditions glorification predicts
less support, except for when the ingroup is working alone to criticize both groups.
Agreement with the critique and support for negotiations with Palestinians both follow
different but similar patterns; glorification is less predictive when the ingroup is working
alone to criticize both groups.
Linking research on rejection of ingroup members of join outgroups (Travaglino
et al., 2014) to research on glorification, this demonstrates that those who strongly glorify
the ingroup are especially sensitive to ingroup members working with outgroup members.
Connecting this to research on the role of glorification in shaping how people protect the
ingroup’s moral image (e.g., Leidner et al., 2010) and research on sensitivity to criticism
of the ingroup (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2002), this research shows that glorifiers react most
negatively when both groups work together to criticize just the ingroup. However, it also
shows that that critiquing the outgroup in addition can attenuate the negative reactions of
those who strongly glorify the ingroup.
Beyond direct effects, Study 3 also showed support for the hypothesis that anger
and hope (see Halperin & Pilskin, 2015) would mediate the interactive relationships
between glorification, group composition, and target of criticism. Glorification decreased
support for allowing the organization to present when both groups were working together
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or when the ingroup was working alone and critiquing the ingroup by increasing anger
and decreasing hope. Likewise, glorification predicted stronger agreement with the
critique of the organization when both groups were working together and criticizing both
groups or when the ingroup was criticizing only the ingroup, and it did so by increasing
anger and decreasing hope (or increasing hope in the case of the ingroup working alone
and criticizing both groups, although this finding should be taken with caution without a
significant direct effect of glorification in that condition). Glorification decreased support
for negotiations by increasing anger when both groups were working together; it
increased agreement with the critique when the ingroup was working alone to critique
just the ingroup by increasing anger.
At the same time, and consistent with Studies 1-2, Study 3 did not significantly
impact support for specific political solutions to end the conflict. Thus, whereas the group
composition of an activist organization and the way it targets its criticism may shape
people’s openness to peace activists having an opportunity to voice their views, and may
even affect openness to negotiations with Palestinians, these factors seem unlikely to
affect people’s support for specific solutions, such as a one-state solution or a two-state
solution.
These patterns highlight the importance of people’s preconceived beliefs in the
conflict (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). Slight differences in the framing of a manipulation
are unlikely to change people’s preconceived support for peace activism or support for
specific solutions to end the conflict, but they may alter the way in which other
psychological factors, such as glorification (Roccas et al., 2008), shape their support.
This may explain why group composition and target of criticism do not interact
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independent of glorification; rather, the way in which they interact depends upon how
strongly participants glorify the ingroup. 10
It is also possible that people’s preconceived beliefs in the conflict may inform
their responses to critiques of the activist organization. Even though people high in
glorification tended to be more likely to agree with critiques of the organization, it is
possible that those who do not strongly glorify the ingroup agree with the critiques for a
variety of reasons. For example, they may perceive the organization as having naïve
perceptions of possible solutions to the conflict because of how other members of the
ingroup will receive them, expecting other ingroup members to react aversely.

10

Additionally, inspection of the means from Study 3 using a mixed ANOVA (with group composition,
target of criticism, and their interaction testing the difference between perceptions of the organization as
critical of Israel and as critical of Palestinians as repeated measures) suggest that, across conditions,
participants generally perceived that the organization was more critical of Israel than of Palestinians, F(1,
228) = 191.52, p < .001, suggesting that although the manipulation stating that the organization was
critical of both groups increased participants’ beliefs that the organization was critical of Palestinians,
participants still generally perceived the organization as most critical of Israel. This may reflect
participants’ motivation to be sensitive to criticism of their ingroup, which becomes especially important
in contexts of protracted conflict (Bar-Tal et al., 2012).
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CHAPTER 5
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This dissertation research shows that glorification predicts negative responses to
activism to end intergroup conflict, and in particular when it takes the form of intergroup
solidarity, where both groups are working together. Study 3 showed direct evidence that
glorification moderates how people react to intergroup solidarity, and also showed
evidence that having both groups criticize both groups may attenuate the relationship
between glorification and outcomes reflecting support for an activist organization.
Taken together, these findings address the need for research on the psychological
factors that impact whether people react with support or backlash to peace activism
(Louis, 2009). It does so in a context of protracted conflict whereby people are especially
prone to cling to an image of their group as moral and unified (Bar-Tal et al., 2012). The
findings of Study 3 in particular have important implications for theory and spur new
directions for future research.
This research shows evidence that whether people support or react with backlash
to intergroup solidarity in activism to end intractable conflict is dependent on at least
three factors: how they identify with the ingroup (e.g., Roccas et al., 2008) whether the
activist organization includes members of both groups working together or just the
ingroup working alone; and how the organization directs its criticism. As such, these
findings contribute to theory on indirect exposure to outgroups (e.g., Leshem et al., 2016;
O’Brien et al., in press; Saguy & Halperin, 2014), defensiveness against criticism of the
ingroup (Ariyanto et al., 2010; Hornsey et al., 2002), emotions in protracted conflict
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(Halperin & Pilskin, 2015), and distinct modes of social identification (Leidner et al.,
2010; Roccas et al., 2006; 2008).
In particular, this dissertation research shows that the extent to which people view
their ingroup as superior and revere deference to its norms (e.g., glorification) predicts
aversive reactions towards activist organizations working to resolve conflict with the
outgroup. This finding itself is not surprising, because peace activists are expressly
defying the ingroup’s norms and authorities, and at least implying that the ingroup has
erred. However, as Study 3 shows, those who glorify their ingroup strongly are
particularly sensitive to members of their ingroup working with the outgroup. This links
research on glorification (Roccas et al., 2008) with research showing that group members
reject deviants (Hutchison & Abrams, 2003; Schacter, 1951), especially those who
strongly identify with the ingroup (Hutchison & Abrams, 2003), and especially when
those deviants leave the ingroup to join an outgroup with whom they are in competition
(Travaglino et al., 2014), demonstrating that specifically glorification rather than ingroup
identification generally (e.g., Hutchison & Abrams, 2003) predicts more negative
reactions to those defying group norms by working with an outgroup.
The findings from Study 3 also raise important questions regarding those who do
not glorify their ingroup strongly. These findings suggest that those who do not strongly
glorify their ingroup are those who are most likely to react positively to intergroup
solidarity. However, in contrast to findings on sensitivity to criticism of the ingroup (e.g.,
Ariyanto et al., 2010), low glorifiers may actually react negatively to ingroup members
who criticize the outgroup, rather than simply responding negatively to outgroup
members who criticize the ingroup. Their responses towards an activist organization of
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just their ingroup members criticizing just the ingroup were more positive than their
responses towards an activist organization of ingroup members criticizing both the
ingroup and the outgroup. Whereas high glorifiers are generally defensive against threats
to the ingroup’s moral image (e.g., Leidner et al., 2010; Roccas et al., 2006), this could
suggest that low glorifiers may even want their ingroup to take responsibility for conflict,
or at least express concern about the outgroup receiving criticism. Future research should
test mechanisms explaining why those who do not strongly glorify their ingroup react
more positively on certain outcomes to the ingroup being the only target of criticism.
As in Study 2, the rate of participants who did not pass attention checks in Study
3 also point to important insights for future studies in this program of research. Of
particular concern was the rate of participants who did not pass the attention check
regarding the target of criticism. Supplementary analyses indicate that whereas
participants who did not pass this attention check and the attention check on group
composition administered at the end of the study were significantly lower on attachment
than those who did pass, even excluding those participants who did not pass the group
composition attention check, those who did not pass the target of criticism were still
marginally lower on attachment. People who were low on attachment may also have been
less engaged in this study, and thus tired towards the end. This could explain why so
many people did not pass this attention check regarding target of criticism. However, the
continuous measure of perceived criticism shows evidence that this manipulation
generally increased perceptions of the organization as critical of the outgroup. In future
research to prepare for publication, I am considering a study to replicate the two-way
interactions between group composition and glorification, adding measures to build upon
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these findings of Study 3 and also address the study’s methodological limitations. For
example, although I would not add the same attention check used in the current research
to directly follow the manipulation, adding a continuous measure of perceptions of group
composition, similar to the continuous measure of perceived criticism, could indicate
whether the manipulation was effective without making clear the study purpose. In Study
1, the rate of participants who did not pass the attention check were not particularly high
except in the outgroup condition. In Study 2, they were high in the outgroup and ingroup
conditions, but since there was generally a low number of participants in this study, there
was reason to suspect that the rate of participants who did not pass would decrease.
Although each of these studies improved upon the prior in some way,
methodological flaws may point to the strength of the context and participants’ prior
experiences. Asking participants to “imagine” a peace activist is not strong enough to
impact their reactions to those peace activist organizations. In hindsight, and partly based
on the attention check, the outgroup condition likely left many participants confused in
Study 2, and so this condition was eliminated for subsequent studies. In Study 3,
regardless of whether it was explicitly stated that the organization was critical of both
Israeli and Palestinian policies and actions, participants perceive that the organization is
more critical of Israel than of Palestinians, perhaps reflecting a general tendency to be
sensitive to criticism of the ingroup in contexts of protracted conflict (e.g., Bar-Tal et al.,
2012).
This could point to a direction for future research. For example, whereas past
research shows that representations of groups as belonging to one inclusive group can
lead to more favorable representations of formerly outgroup members (e.g., Gaertner,
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Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994), and that group members have more
negative evaluations of former ingroup members who leave the ingroup to join an
outgroup (Travaglino et al., 2014), representations of ingroup members working with
outgroup members could lead to perceptions of ingroup members as belonging to the
outgroup. This could depend on glorification, whereby those who strongly glorify the
ingroup and are thus sensitive to the defiance of norms recategorize ingroup members
working with the outgroup as outgroup members and evaluate them more negatively.
Future research should also address how those high and low in glorification react
differentially to criticism. For example, whereas past research has shown that people
evaluate ingroup members criticizing the ingroup more positively than outgroup members
because they perceive critics from the ingroup as constructive (Hornsey, Trembath, &
Gunthorpe, 2004), how people perceive the consequences of criticism could depend on
their levels of glorification (Roccas et al., 2008). Those who do not strongly glorify the
ingroup may perceive criticism as constructive, whereas those who strongly glorify the
ingroup perceive criticism as damaging to the ingroup.
Conclusion
This dissertation integrates theory on distinct modes of social identity (Leidner et
al., 2010; Roccas et al., 2008) with research on deviance of group norms (Schacter, 1951;
Travaglino et al., 2014) and exposure to group-based criticism from ingroup and
outgroup members during conflict (Ariyanto et al., 2010; Saguy & Halperin, 2014). It
shows that, in a context of protracted conflict, high glorifiers in particular are sensitive to
learning about activism to advocate ending the conflict, particularly to members of their
ingroup working with an outgroup, and particularly when the criticism targets exclusively
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their ingroup. Future research will seek to replicate and extend findings regarding the
differential effects of both groups working together among those who strongly glorify
their ingroup vs. those who do not, as well as the reduction of backlash among those who
glorify their ingroup when only ingroup members are involved and both groups are the
target of criticism.
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APPENDIX: MEASURES
Support for political solutions
A two-state solution based on the pre-1967 lines, with all settlements in the West Bank
evacuated to the pre-1967 lines and Jerusalem divided (solution reflecting the most
compromise)

A one-state solution, in which Israel remains a Jewish state with Palestinian enclaves
(solution involving least compromise to the ingroup).

Glorification (Full Scale from Study 1):
On the next page, please report your opinion on the role of Israel in the world.
Remember, there are no right or wrong answers.
Other nations can learn a lot from us.
In today’s world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of our nation.
The IDF is the best army in the world.
One of the important things that we have to teach children is to respect the leaders of our
nation.
Relative to other nations, we are a very moral nation.
It is disloyal for Israelis to criticize Israel.
Israel is better than other nations in all respects.
There is generally a good reason for every rule and regulation made by our national
authorities.
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Attachment (Full Scale from Study 1):
On the next page, we are interested in how you perceive yourself as an Israeli citizen.
Again, there are no right or wrong answers.
I love Israel.
Being an Israeli is an important part of my identity.
It is important to me to contribute to my nation.
It is important to me to view myself as an Israeli.
I am strongly committed to my nation.
It is important to me that everyone will see me as an Israeli.
It is important for me to serve my country.
When I talk about Israelis I usually say “we” rather than “they.”

Emotions towards organization in Studies 2-3
In the next set of questions we would like to ask you about the emotions you feel when
thinking about (Israelis working for a Solution/Israelis and Palestinians working for a
solution). To do so please move the slider below anywhere between “Not at all” and
“Absolutely”. When thinking about (name of organization) I feel…11
...angry
...irritated
...hopeful
...annoyed
...irate

11

Other emotions, including several items assessing fear, and one item meant to be used as a reverse for
“hope’ were also measured.
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...betrayed
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